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INTRODUCTION 
<quotation>(T)he growing visibility of the social-policy provisions [in the Treaty] 
requires the definition of the notion of rights and principles and their implications for 
private parties.1</quotation> 
The last 15 years have witnessed the development of a particular set of EU norms for 
determining jurisdiction and applicable law for cross-border contracts in disputes brought 
before the courts of a Member State. These norms have and continue to be devised in 
response to the increasing cross-border nature of commercial activities and the need for 
parties, especially weaker parties, to be able to µDFFHVV>VRFLDO@MXVWLFH¶,2 and for the EU to 
demonstrate and UHIOHFWµJOREDOHWKLFDOYDOXHVWKURXJKQHZKXPDQULJKWV¶.3 In particular, the 
post Lisbon-era has witnessed the further advancement of a third wave4 of EU private 
international laws. These particular EU rules are illustrative of a set of µmethodological, 
institutional and procedural¶5 norms, intended to meet the objective6 of securing mutual trust 
and recognition in civil and commercial matters. The purpose of this chapter is to review 
recent legislative and interpretative developments in EU private international law and to 
consider future questions on the role of the third wave of EU private international laws as an 
emerging set of techniques7 for enabling access to social justice. Reflecting the three wave 
development of private international law rules at EU level, Part I of this chapter considers 
how Treaty objectives act as the procedural underpinning in the approximation of national 
private international laws in furtherance of µRSWLPDO[EU] LQWHJUDWLRQ¶.8 Part II then reviews the 
technique of approximation of laws through selected secondary and recast EU Regulations. 
Specifically this has been demonstrated first by the introduction of EU Regulations on 
applicable law for contract and non-contractual obligations which have sought to provide a 
coherent basis for party autonomy to underpin rules determining the applicable law for 
contracts and non-contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters and, second, most 
recently in the revision and replacement of the Brussels I Regulation. Since 10 January 
2015, Regulation EU 1215/2012 (the Brussels I Recast) has introduced a number of 
significant changes including the introduction of a new ground of jurisdiction for the recovery 
                                                          
1 C Semmelmann, µThe European Union's economic constitution under the Lisbon Treaty: soul-
searching among lawyers shifts the focus to procedure¶ [2010] European Law Review 516, 532. 
Words in brackets added for emphasis. 
2 H-W Micklitz,¶Introduction,¶ in H-W Micklitz (ed.), The Many Concepts of Social Justice (Edward 
Elgar, 2011), 5. 
3 I Benöhr and H-W Micklitz, µConsumer Protection and Human Rights,¶ in G Howells, I Ramsay and T 
Wilhelmsson (eds), Handbook of Research on International Consumer Law (Edward Elgar, 2010), 18. 
4 L Gillies, µCreation of subsidiary jurisdiction rules in the Recast of Brussels I: Back to the drawing 
board?¶ (2012) 8 Journal of Private International Law 490. 
5 Semmelmann (n.1), 532. 
6 Cf S Weatherill, EU Consumer Law and Policy, 2nd edn (Edward Elgar, 2013), 283. 
7 I Ramsay, Consumer Law and Policy, 3rd edn (Hart Publishing, 2012), 29. 
8 R. Fentiman, µChoice of law in Europe: Uniformity and integration¶ (2008) 82 Tulane Law Review 
2012, 2051. Word in bracket added for syntax. 
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of cultural objects;9 a basis upon which there may be a stay of proceedings in favour of prior 
proceedings in a non-Member State; clarification of the position of the court first seised in the 
cases where proceedings have been brought contrary to a jurisdiction or arbitration 
agreement; and the extension of the dual10 operation of national residual jurisdiction through 
the gradual extension of the EU acquis via the µSDUWLDOreflex effect¶. The legislative approach 
to approximation of EU private international laws for the promotion of the internal market has 
also been evident in recent proposals for Regulations on Collective Consumer Redress and 
a Common European Sales Law. Part III of this chapter focusses on the interpretative 
approach of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in asserting mutual trust, 
mutual recognition and fundamental rights in civil and commercial matters under the 
Brussels I Recast Regulation and Rome I and II Regulations. Part IV examines procedural 
developments for the effective enforcement of judgments from the courts of a Member State 
through the abolition of exequatur in the Brussels I Recast. Combining these parts, this 
chapter concludes that in order to effectively regulate internal market behaviour and respect 
the continued divergences in national laws, the current stage of approximation of EU private 
international laws requires to be applied in tandem with substantive EU and national laws. 
Only then will EU private international law be regarded as a methodological, institutional and 
procedural11 gatekeeper in enhancing fundamental social rights in the resolution of cross-
border disputes. 
PART I: CONFLICTS JUSTICE AND THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN 
THE THIRD WAVE EU PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAWS 
7KHDLPRUµVRFLDOREOLJDWLRQ¶,12 of private international law is to provide parties to a cross-
ERUGHUGLVSXWHZLWKµFRQIOLFWVMXVWLFH¶. This distinct form of social justice seeks to recognise 
foreign laws and sustain cross-ERUGHUOHJDOUHODWLRQVKLSVWKURXJKWKHRSHUDWLRQRIµVHFRQGDU\
ruOHV¶.13 When one party contracts with a seller in another jurisdiction, the cross-border 
nature of such a contract continues to necessitate reference to such rules. In particular, 
these rules determine where the aggrieved party may bring a dispute to court, what law 
applies to their dispute and in what circumstances a foreign judgment may be recognised 
and enforced. Depending on the scope and objective of the rules in question, the formation 
of private international laws are either subject to the exclusive competence of the EU or 
continue to remain (for the time being)14 residual to the Member States. 
Whilst the EU strives towards the approximation of private international laws, it is 
KHOSIXOWREULHIO\UHIOHFWRQWKHWUDGLWLRQDODQG(8REMHFWLYHVRIµFRQIOLFWVMXVWLFH¶7KHILUVW
objective ±µPDLQWDLQ>LQJ@UHJXODWRU\GLYHUVLW\¶15 ± reflects a general premise to enable parties 
to predict, determine and select the forum and law applicable to their cross-border 
relationships.16 The second objective of traditional conflicts justice, as this author has 
previously commented, is to complement17 techniques of social justice underpinned in 
substantive law. When questions of jurisdiction (where to adjudicate) arise, private 
international law rules enable both parties to predict WKHµOLWLJDWLRQDQGWUDQVDFWLRQDOULVN¶18 
                                                          
9 L Gillies, µThe conflict of laws as a technique of demand side regulation in claims for the recovery of 
cultural objects,¶ (2015) 11 Journal of Private International Law 295. 
10 H Unberath and A Johnston, µThe double-headed approach of the ECJ concerning consumer 
protection¶2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 1237. 
11 Semmelmann (n.1), 532. 
12 Benöhr and Micklitz (n.3), 25. 
13 A Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law: Justice, Pluralism and Subsidiary 
in the International Constitutional Ordering of Private Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 19. 
14 Gillies (2012) (n.4). 
15 F Cafaggi and H Muir-Watt, µIntroduction,¶ in F Cafaggi and H Muir-Watt (eds), Making European 
Private Law (Edward Elgar, 2008), 15. Words modified for syntax. 
16 Mills (n.13), 8±10. 
17 L Gillies, Electronic Commerce and International Private Law (Ashgate, 2008). 
18 R Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation, 2nd edn(Oxford University Press, 2015 ), 3 7. 
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associated with potential contractual ± and non-contractual ± relations. In cross-border 
cases concerned with commercial interests, party autonomy remains the prevalent rationale 
in the design and application of jurisdiction and applicable law rules. Commercial parties can 
and do negotiate and allocate jurisdiction to a particular judicial or arbitral court, as well as 
selecting the law applicable to their contractual and non-contractual obligations. Having 
made such choices, commercial parties are then able to determine whether their chosen 
court can issue provisional or protective measures, whether special jurisdiction rules may be 
utilised and the effect of the OH[IRUL¶s mandatory ruleVRQWKHSDUWLHV¶REOLJDWLRQV 
In cross-border cases where special interests are involved ± contracts involving 
weaker parties such as consumers ± the particular emphasis on conflicts justice and private 
international law rules LVWKHµLQHTXDOLW\¶19 of power between the parties and the 
consequential risks of cross-border contracts for the weaker party. When the dispute 
FRQFHUQVDµSURWHFWHG¶20 FRQVXPHUFRQWUDFWµSULYLOHJHG¶21 jurisdiction rules have been 
devised, applied and interpreted at EU level to EDODQFHFRPSHWLQJQRWLRQVRIµMXVWLFHDQG
FRQYHQLHQFH¶22 between contracting parties located in different jurisdictions. As Briggs 
UHPDUNVWKHµUHDOQRYHOW\¶23 LQVHHNLQJµFRQWUDFWXDOHTXDOLW\¶24 IURPWKHFRQVXPHU¶V
perspective25 is being able to sue the seller ± and be sued ± in his home jurisdiction. In 
determining the applicable law for consumer contracts, the tensions between consumer 
protection and party autonomy resulted in a special choice of law rule which preserved the 
latter via a combination of mandDWRU\UXOHVRIWKHFRQVXPHU¶VKDELWXDOUHVLGHQFHDQGWKH
public policy of the lex fori. More recently, a series of special choice of law rules have been 
introduced for a range of disputes concerned with non-contractual obligations in Regulation 
EC 864/2007 (the Rome II Regulation) involving product liability, anti-competitive behaviour 
or acts restricting competition, environmental damage, infringement of intellectual property 
rights and industrial action. Claims for anti-competitive behaviour or acts restricting 
competition may ultimately be facilitated through the ability of consumers or their 
representatives to raise collective claims for damages. 
 
The Procedural Framework of EU Private International Law 
7KHGHYHORSPHQWRI(8SULYDWHLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZUXOHVKDVSURJUHVVHGLQWKUHHµZDYHV¶7KH
first wave was the objective towards the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments and of rules of jurisdiction through the introduction of the Brussels Convention 
1968. The change of the pillar structure by the Amsterdam Treaty brought jurisdiction for civil 
and commercial matters within the µVFRSHRIWKH(8-EDVHGOHJLVODWLRQ¶26 and was intended to 
improve access to justice through improving and simplifying rules of conflict of laws and 
jurisdiction where an internal market need was demonstrated and where action by Member 
States alone was regarded as insufficient. In 2007, the Lugano Opinion supplemented this 
DSSURDFKE\FRQILUPLQJWKH(8¶VFRPSHWHQFH27 to legislate on those external matters having 
an impact on the internal market. Regulation EC 44/2001 (the Brussels I Regulation) 
                                                          
19 A Briggs, The Conflict of Laws, 3rd edn (Clarendon, 2013), 72. 
20 P, EU Private International Law, 3rd edn (Edward Elgar, 2014), 125. 
21 Briggs (n.19), 72. 
22 AE Jaffey, Topics in Choice of Law (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1996), 
49±51. 
23 Briggs (n.19), 72. 
24 D Leczykiewicz, µHorizontal application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights¶ (2013) European Law 
Review 479, 494. 
25 Briggs (n.19), 72. 
26 C Twigg-Flesner, A Cross-Border-Only Regulation for Consumer Transactions in the EU: a Fresh 
Approach to EU Consumer Law (Springer, 2011), 4. 
27 Opinion 1/03 of the Court on the competence of the Community to conclude the new Lugano 
Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, [2006] ECR I-1145. 
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introduced revised jurisdiction rules for consumer contracts to take account of developments 
not foreseen when the Brussels Convention 1968 was being negotiated. It reaffirmed the 
µ&RXQWU\RI'HVWLQDWLRQ¶DSSURDFKLQWKH%UXVVHOV&RQYHQWLRQE\HQDEOLQJDFRQVXPHU
(subject to particular criteria) to suHDIRUHLJQEXVLQHVVLQWKHFRQVXPHU¶VMXULVGLFWLRQ0RUH
recently, the third wave of approximated EU private international laws continues as a result 
of Article 81 of the Treaty of Lisbon, supported by the Stockholm Programme.28 Article 81 
provides for the approximation of laws and has been exemplified by the introduction of 
various EU Regulations on choice of law29 and the interpretation and revision of key aspects 
of the Brussels I Regulation.  
In the last ten years, the regulatory function and framework of EU private 
international law has pursued the objective of approximation of laws, promoted the function 
of the internal market, sustained the principle of mutual recognition and more recently sought 
to support the enforcement of transnational fundamental rights.30 Private international laws 
require to be utilised in cases of lis pendens (parallel proceedings), in litigation involving 
multiple parties in different jurisdictions, in litigation concerning arbitration and jurisdiction 
agreements and in determining jurisdiction over disputes connected to non-EU Member 
States. Two key developments have contributed towards the creation of a transnational 
framework of EU private international law. First, the basis and technique of formulating 
private international laws shifted from national interests and international cooperation to a 
focus on transnational interests. This was achieved through a combination of competence 
changes brought about by the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Lisbon and by EU 
Regulations introduced and interpreted by the EU Institutions. Second, it is recognised that 
private international laws offer a discrete regulatory function for the global ordering of private 
disputes.31 The effect of this framework is intended to have continued impact where cross-
border disputes have connections external to the EU. However, as Muir-Watt confirms, the 
ZLGHUIXQFWLRQRISULYDWHLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZPXVWVHUYHQRWMXVWWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VULJKWWRDFFHVV
justice through proceedings in a foreign court, or the application of a foreign law, or the 
enforcement of a judgment. According to Muir-Watt, private international law must be used 
as a regulatory technique which responds to emerging trends in global governance and 
cross-border litigation.32 Private international law must also continue to respond to the 
increasing role of businesses as well as institutions in the regulation of legal relationships 
FRQGXFWHGYLDHOHFWURQLFFRPPHUFH,WLVLQWKLVFRQWH[WWKDWWKHµQHHG>IRUDQG@DFFHSWDQFH¶33 
of EU private international laws as a technique of social justice must be sustained. 
First, the introduction of two new Regulations have sought to provide a coherent 
basis for party autonomy to underpin rules determining the applicable law for contracts and 
non-contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters. Second, the revision of 
Regulation EC44/2001 by Regulation EU1215/2012, the Brussels I Recast Regulation, has 
with effect from 10 January 2015 sought to µUHVSHFWIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWV>«@LQSDUWLFXODU>«@
                                                          




people can enforce their rights «¶ZRUGVUHPRYHGDQGDGGHGIRUV\QWD[ 
29 By contrast to the range and breadth of case law on the Brussels I Regulation, Preliminary 
References on the Rome I and II Regulations have been less frequent ; as regards Article 4(4) of the 
Rome Convention 1980 (the precursor to Rome I) , see Case C-133/08, Intercontainer Interfrigo SC 
(ICF) v Balkenende Oosthuizen BV [2009] ECR I-9687. 
30 L Gillies, µFundamental rights and judicial cooperation in the decisions of the Court of Justice on the 
Brussels I Regulation 2009±2014: The story so far,¶LQ6 Morano-Foadi and L Vickers (eds), 
Fundamental Rights in the EU: A Matter for Two Courts (Hart Publishing, 2015). 
31 H. Muir Watt, µThe role of the conflict of laws in European private law¶ in C. Twigg-Flesner (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to European Union Private Law (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
32 Cafaggi and Muir-Watt (n.15), 14; Mills (n.13), 1, 28, and Muir-Watt, ibid. 
33 Benöhr and Micklitz (n.3), 25. 
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ArticlHRIWKH&KDUWHU¶;34 introduced a basis for the stay of proceedings in favour of 
pending proceedings in a non-Member State; clarified the position as regards the operation 
of jurisdiction and arbitration agreements under the EU Regime and extended the dual35 
operation of national residual jurisdiction through the gradual extension of the EU acquis via 
µSDUWLDOreflex effect.¶ Part II of this chapter will now turn to the interpretative approach of the 
CJEU in asserting mutual trust and recognition in jurisdiction rules under the Brussels I 
Regulation for civil and commercial matters and consider the changes that have been 
brought into effect by the Brussels I Recast. 
PART II:  METHODOLOGY OF EU 44/2001 IN RECENT CASE LAW OF THE 
CJEU AND THE EFFECT OF THE BRUSSELS I RECAST 
During the last ten years, the interpretation of specific jurisdiction rules in the Brussels I 
Regulation by the Court of Justice has provided a particular insight into how the 
5HJXODWLRQ¶VVFRSHDQGREMHFWLYHVKDYHEHHQUH-affirmed µE\WKHODQJXDJHRILWUXOHV¶.36 
There are four key areas where this has occurred; first, the assertion of jurisdiction in a 
Member State in breach of a jurisdiction or arbitration agreement; second, in the continued 
operation of Member StatHV¶LQWHUQDOMurisdiction rules; third in procedural measures 
designed to restrict proceedings abroad and fourth E\WKH&RXUWRI-XVWLFH¶VSDUWLFXODULVHG
approach to the interpretation of business to business special jurisdiction based on breach 
of contract, torts and claims involving multiple parties. These µsquare of impact¶judgments 
are reflective of the evolution of the four cornerstones of civil jurisdiction espoused by the 
Jenard Report37 and Kruger.38 In particular, they demonstrate the continuing role of the 
CJEU in determining on what basis the court of a Member State under the Brussels I 
Regime can assert jurisdiction and the response of the other EU institutions through the 
process of legislative review. (DFKRIWKHVHIRXUFRUQHUVRIWKH&-(8¶V interpretative 
square will be examined before the effect of the revision of the Brussels I Recast will be 
considered. 
Business to Business Jurisdiction 
The rationale of the Brussels I Regime is to ensure jurisdiction is allocated to a Member 
6WDWHLQIXOILOPHQWRIWKH5HJXODWLRQ¶VREMHFWLYHVA related concern that,until recently, has 
persisted is whether the courts of a Member State are permitted to stay proceedings in 
favour of proceedings in the courts of a third or non-Member State. The Court of Justice 
confirmed in Owusu v Jackson39 that the courts of a Member State are not, on the basis of 
forum non conveniens, permitted to stay proceedings in favour of the courts of another 
Member State or a third State.40 In his Opinion in the case, AG Leger proposed three ways 
in which the Brussels Convention could operate by way of reflex effect either by the 
operation of Article 22  (now  Article 24 ), a jurisdiction agreement in favour of a non-Member 
State or concurrent proceedings in a non-Member State. The Court of Justice confirmed that 
the Brussels Convention (the instrument applicable at the date of proceedings) provided a 
mandatory bDVLVIRUMXULVGLFWLRQVRDVWRµUHVSHFW>«@Whe principle of legal certaiQW\¶41 and 
that in doing so the Convention could extend WKHµREOLJDWLRQV>«@of the courts of a Member 
6WDWH¶42 to assert jurisdiction under the Regime, irrespective of any connections the dispute 
                                                          
34 Regulation EU 1215/2012, Recital (38). 
35 Unberath and Johnston (n.10). 
36 R Fentiman, µCivil jurisdiction and third states: Owusu and after¶ (2006) 43 Common Market Law 
Review 705. 
37 Jenard-Moller Report, OJ 1990 C189/65. 
38 T Kruger, Civil Jurisdiction Rules of the EU and their Impact on Third States (Oxford University 
Press, 2008). 
39 Case C-281/02 Owusu v Jackson [2005] ECR I-01383. 
40 Owusu, paras 37±41. 
41 Owusu, para.38. 
42 A Dickinson, µResurgence of the anti-suit injunction: the Brussels I Regulation as a source of civil 
obligations?¶ (2008) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 465, 469. 
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may have with the courts of a non-Member State. The introduction of Articles 33 and 34 of 
the Brussels I Recast which now enables the courts of a Member State to grant a stay 
proceedings in favour of prior related proceedings the courts of a non-Member State would 
now appear to have addressed the concern. 
The second and third corners RIWKH&-(8¶VVTXDUHRILmpact decisions may be 
considered simultaneously.. The second corner of CJEU decisions has been concerned 
with the assertion of jurisdiction in one Member State in breach of a jurisdiction or 
arbitration agreement in favour of the courts of another Member State. The two 
predominant cases are Gasser v MISAT43 and Allianz Spa v West Tankers (The Front 
Comor).44 In Gasser v MISAT, one of the parties commenced proceedings in the Italian 
court in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in favour of Austria. The Court of 
Justice affirmed that the Italian courts could assert jurisdiction as the court first seised, 
LUUHVSHFWLYHRIWKHSDUWLHV¶SULRUjurisdiction agreement on the premise that mutual trust and 
confidence must be ensured in allocating jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention so as 
WRµprevent parallel proceedings [and] avoid conflicts between decisions¶.45 In similar 
fashion, the decision in Allianz Spa confirmed that proceedings could continue in the courts 
of a Member State (Italy) in breach of an agreement to arbitrate in the courts of another 
Member State (England). 
The introduction of Regulation EU 1215/2012, the Brussels I Recast, now offers 
scope for a different outcome as regards the operation of a jurisdiction agreement and the 
role of the court seised. Recital (22) and Article 31(2) of that Regulation confirm that an 
µexception to the general lis pendens UXOH¶46 is justified where an exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement operates and the court of a Member State is seised for that purpose. In such a 
situation, proceedings in the other FRXUWµVKDOOEHVWD\HG¶47 until the jurisdiction of the court 
µGHVLJQDWHG¶48 in the jurisdiction agreement is determined. Whilst proceedings brought in 
breach of an arbitration agreement remain possible under the Recast, subject to Recital 
(12) and its limited µHIIHFWV¶,49 the national court may still reIHUWKHSDUWLHVWRDUELWUDWLRQµin 
accoUGDQFHZLWK>LWV@QDWLRQDOODZ¶.50 The third corner is concerned with procedural 
measures designed to restrict proceedings abroad. The case of Turner v Grovit51 confirmed 
that it is incompatible with the Brussels Convention for the court of a Member State to grant 
an anti-suit injunction to restrict proceedings in the courts of another Member State. The 
position under the Brussels I Recast is ± not surprisingly in the light of the scope and 
objectives of mutual trust in the allocation of jurisdiction and through the mutual, automatic 
recognition of judgments ± unchanged. 
The fourth corner of the square is illustrative through an emerging set of 
particularised interpretations from the Court of Justice on special jurisdiction rules for breach 
of contract, torts, disputes involving multiple parties and consumer contracts. In matters 
relating to contract, there have been a number of recent cases which have sought to 
emphasise the distinction between the special grounds of jurisdiction contained in Article 
7(1) (ex Article 5(1)) and as between Articles 7(1) and 7(2) (ex Articles 5(1) and 5(3)). Three 
recent cases illustrate the scope of jurisdiction under Article 7(1)(a) (ex Article 5(1)(a)) for a 
matter relating to contract. In eská sporitelna v Feichter,52 the Court of Justice confirmed, 
                                                          
43 Case C-116/02, Gasser v MISAT [2003] ECR I-14693. 
44 Case C-185/07 Allianz Spa v West Tankers (The Front Comor) [2009] ECR I-00663. 
45 Gasser, para.41. 
46 Brussels I Recast, Recital (22). 
47 Brussels I Recast, Article 31(2). 
48 Brussels I Recast, Recital (22). 
49 TC Hartley, µThe Brussels I Regulation and arbitration¶ (2014) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 843, 860. 
50 Brussels I Recast, Recital (12). 
51 Hartley (n.49), 861. 
52 Case C-419/11, eská Sporitelna v Gerlad Feichter [2013] ECR 0000,14 March 2013. 
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inter alia,53 that a claim regarding the issue of an incomplete promissory note and its 
VXEVHTXHQWLVVXHFRQVWLWXWHGDµlegal obligation freely consented to by one person towards 
DQRWKHU¶54 and therefore a matter relating to contract under Article 5(1)(a) (now Article 
7(1)(a)). In Electrosteel Europe v Edil Centro55 the Court was requested to clarify the place 
RIGHOLYHU\DVWKHµSODFHRISHUIRUPDQFHRIWKHREOLJDWLRQLQTXHVWLRQ>«@XQGHUWKHFRQWUDFW¶56 
for the purposes of Article 5(1)(b) (now Article 7(1)(b)) (ex). More recently, in Brogsitter v 
Fabrication des Montres Normandes,57 the Court of Justice was required to determine 
whether the dispute in question constituted a matter relating to tort (following national law 
interpretation) or a matter relating to contract.The Court of Justice confirmed first, that for the 
latter basis to operate uniformly and in line with the objectives of the Regulation, the 
obligation must be classified as contractual; second, the dispute upon which jurisdiction is 
premised must constitute a breach of contractual rights and obligations in respect to which, 
third, regard should be given tRµWKHSXUSRVHRIWKHFRQWUDFW¶.58  Following a series of 
decisions from Falco Privastifung59 through to Rehder v Air Baltic,60 Color Drack61 and Wood 
Floor Solutions,62 the Court of Justice has continued to distinguish the applicability of Article 
5(1) (now Article 7 (1)) for the sale of goods, the provision of services63 and mixed contracts. 
The Court of Justice has also continued to develop its jurisprudence on special jurisdiction in 
the Brussels I Regulation through a series of particularised rulings on the scope of Article 
5(3)  (now  Article 7(2)) in respect to claims for breach of intellectual property.64 Two cases 
of interest to business to business relations were concerned with multiple perpetrators on the 
one hand and the liabilities of director/shareholder on the other. The former issue was 
considered in Hi Hotel HCF v Uwe Spoering.65 This case follows on from the earlier decision 
in Melzer66 where the court confirmed that LWZRXOGEHµcontrary to the general scheme and 
REMHFWLYHV¶67 of the Brussels I Regulation for Article 5(3) (now Article 7(2) ) to apply where 
the defendant had not acted within the jurisdiction. In the former case, the defendant was 
alleged to have acted in France; however, the claimant was seeking to establish jurisdiction 
for breach of copyright which was alleged to have occurred via a third party publisher in 
Germany. Whilst the Court of Justice confirmed that Article 5(3) (now Article 7(2)) could not 
                                                          
53 The CJEU also confirmed that a managing director or majority shareholder did not constitute a 
µFRQVXPHU¶IRUWKHSXrposes of Article 15, Regulation EC 44/2001. 
54 Sporitelna, para.47; affirmed in Case C-147/12, ÖFAB, Östergötlands v Frank Koot and Evergreen 
Investments, [2013] ECR 00000, 18 July 2013, para.33; see also C-375/13 Harald Kolassa v Barclays 
Bank plc [2015] ECR 00000 28 January 2015, paras 36-41,  
55 Case C-87/10 Electrosteel Europe SA v Edil Centro SpA [2011] ECR 0000, 9 June 2011. 
56 Electrosteel, paras 15, 18. 
57 Case C-548/12, Brogsitter v Fabrication des Montres Normandes [2014] ECR 0000, 13 March 
2014. 
58 Brogsitter, paras 24±25, 29. Word modified for syntax. 
59 Case C-533/07, Falco Privastifung v Weller-Lindhorst [2009] ECR I-3327. 
60 Case C-204/08 Rehder v Air Baltic Corporation [2009] ECR I-06073. 
61 Case C-386/05 Color Drack GmbH v Lexx International Vertriebs GmbH [2007] ECR I-03699. 
62 Case C-19/09 Wood Floor Solutions Andreas Domberger v Silva Trade [2010] ECR I-02121. 
63 Case C-469/12 Lager & Umschlagbetriebs v Olbrich Transport und Logistik GmbH,(14 November 
2013) C-102, 7 April 2014, where the Court of Justice ordered that a contract for the storage of goods 
constituted a contract for the provision of services. 
64 It is submitted that a more particularised series of judgments is emerging on the interpretation of 
Article 7(2) (ex Article 5(3)) for specialist torts such as, inter alia, infringement of intellectual property  
rights on the Internet; Cases C-523/10, Wintersteiger AG v products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH, 
[2012]  ECR 00000, 19 April 2012; C-170/12, Pinckney v Mediatech [2013] ECR 00000, 3 October 
2013, on which see further L Gillies, µJurisdiction, international private law and the internet,¶ LQ / 
Edwards (ed.), Law, Policy and the Internet, 4th edn, (Hart Publishing, forthcoming). 
65 Case C-387/12, Hi Hotel HCF v Uwe Spoering [2014] ECR 00000, 3 April 2014. 
66 Case C-228/11, Melzer v MF Global UK Ltd [2013] ECR 00000,16 May 2013. 
67 Melzer, para.36. 
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be a basis of jurisdiction against a defendant who did not act there, jurisdiction was 
established in Germany as the place of damage with damages limited to that place. With 
regard to the latter issue of dLUHFWRUV¶VKDUHKROGHUV¶ liability, in  ÖFAB, Östergötlands v Koot68 
the Court of Justice offered responses to two important sub-questions; first, that the place of 
a harmful event which is alleged to have resulted from the actions of directors or 
VKDUHKROGHUVLVµWKHSODFHWRZKLFKWKHDFWLYLWLHV>«@DQGWKHILQDQFLDOVLWXDWLRQUHOated to 
WKRVHDFWLYLWLHVDUHFRQQHFWHG¶69 and second that the determination of jurisdiction under 
Article 5(3) (now Article 7(2))  LVXQDIIHFWHGZKHQDFUHGLWRUµWUDQVIHUV¶70 a claim to another 
creditor. A final species of special jurisdiction which also continues to be significant is 
jurisdiction over multiple defendants, µin the court for the place where any one of them is 
GRPLFLOHG¶.71 In the decision Land Berlin v Sapir and Others,72 the Court of Justice was 
required to determine whether the recovery of unpaid monies from a compensation scheme 
paid by a public body fell within the scope of a civil and commercial matter in accordance 
with the Brussels I Regulation and if so whether Article 6(1) (now Article 8(1)) applied and 
extended to claims where other defendants were not domiciled in an EU Member State. The 
Court confirmed that given the nature of the scheme and the basis upon which monies could 
be claimed under it, the dispute was a civil and commercial matter for the purposes of Article 
1; second, the Court confirmed its earlier reasoning in Freeport to the extent that Article 6  
(now  Article 8 ) is justified if the connections EHWZHHQSURFHHGLQJVUHQGHULWµexpedient to 
determine those actions together in order to avoid the riVNRILUUHFRQFLODEOHMXGJPHQWV¶.73 As 
regards the third matterWKH&RXUWFRQILUPHGWKDWWKHµVSHFLDO¶74 nature of Article 6  (now 
Article 8 ), in combination with the operation of residual jurisdiction in Article 4  (now  Article 
6 ) DQGH[FOXVLYHMXULVGLFWLRQZKLFKRSHUDWHVUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VGRPLFLOHFRXOG
not mean that Article 6  (now Article 8 ) applied when one of the defendants was domiciled in 
a non-EU Member State. 
Business to Consumer Jurisdiction 
As far as cross-border consumer disputes are concerned, the way in which the EU has 
VRXJKWWRLPSURYHWKHµMXVWGLVWULEXWLRQRIUHJXODWRU\DXWKRULW\¶75 is through the introduction, 
application and interpretation of approximated, EU private international laws. A special or 
particularised strand of social justice has emerged in EU private international law, in 
particular for cross-border consumer contracts. Under Article 15 of Regulation EC 44/2001 
the Brussels I Regulation,76 a private consumer was able to bring proceedings in the 
jurisdiction where he is domiciled subject to the business pursued or having directed its 
commercial activities there. Articles 3, 4 and 6 of the Regulation EC 593/2008, the Rome I 
Regulation, determine the applicable law of the contract and the mandatory rules of the 
FRQVXPHU¶VKDELWXDOUHVLGHQFH,QRUGHUWRµDFFHVVMXVWLFH¶,77 throughout the EU Member 
6WDWHVSULYDWHLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZUXOHVDUHDQH[DPSOHRIDQµDFFHVVto MXVWLFH¶78 technique. 
7KH(8¶VRYerarching objective is to contribute towards the completion of the internal market 
                                                          
68 Case C-147/12, ÖFAB, Östergötlands v Frank Koot and Evergreen Investments [2011] ECR 0000, 
18 July 2013. 
69 ÖFAB, Östergötlands, para.55. 
70 ÖFAB, Östergötlands, para.59. 
71 Article 8 (ex Article 6, Brussels I Regulation). Again, particularised judgments have emerged on the 
infringement of intellectual rights, for example, Cases C-145/10, Eva-Maria Painer v Standard 
VerlagsGmbH and Others [2011] ECR 00000, 1 December 2011, and C-616/10, Solvay SA v Honeywell 
Fluorine and others [2012] ECR 0000, 12 July 2012 ; see further Gillies, in Edwards (ed) (n.64) above. 
72 Case C-645/11, Land Berlin v Ellen Mirjam Sapir and Others [2013] ECR 00000, 11 April 2013. 
73 Land Berlin, para.42; Case C-98/06, Freeport v Arnoldsson [2007] ECR 1-08319. 
74 Land Berlin, para.54. 
75 Mills (n.13), 18; Muir-Watt (n.31) and Gillies (n.14). 
76 Regulation EC 1215/2012, Article 17. 
77 Micklitz (n.2), 5. 
78 Stockholm Programme (n.28) at para.3.1.2. 
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WKURXJKLPSURYLQJWKHµHIIHFWLYHQHVV>RI@FRQVXPHUSROLF\¶,79 the implementation of Articles 
38 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the approximation of laws in civil and 
MXGLFLDOPDWWHUV+RZHYHULIWKHLUYDOXHDVDOHJLWLPDWHWHFKQLTXHRIIDFLOLWDWLQJFRQVXPHUV¶
access to social justice is to be sustained, the role, scope and substance of private 
international laws as second order rules requires continued coordination between national 
and supranational levels. 
Consumers are provided with particular protection in accordance with Treaty and ECHR 
objectives. Readers will be aware that in order to establish jurisdiction in civil and 
FRPPHUFLDOPDWWHUVRYHUDµSURWHFWHG¶80 consumer contract, Regulation EC 44/2001 required 
a business to have its commercial operations or to have directed its activities in the courts of 
the Member State in which the consumer is domiciled. Whilst Briggs regards Article 
15(1)(c)(now Article 17(1)(c))  DVWKHµPRVWVLJQLILFDQW¶81 aspect to establishing jurisdiction 
over such contracts, he recently acknowledged WKDWLWLVµWRRQDUURZLQVFRSH¶.82 Three simple 
examples may be instructive at this point. If an English consumer wanted to sue a seller 
based in Spain for breach of contract, subject to any jurisdiction agreement, he could have 
raised proceedings in England relying on Articles 15(1)(a)±(c) of the Brussels I Regulation. 
Alternatively, if the English consumer wanted to sue a Scottish seller for breach of contract, 
he could do so in the English courts using analogous rules contained in Schedule 4 to the 
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (as amended). Prior to the introduction of the 
Brussels I Recast considered below, if the English consumer had previously wanted to sue a 
business based in Brazil , he would have83 been UHTXLUHGLQWKHDEVHQFHRIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶V
presence, agreement or submission to the English courts) to apply the relevant Member 
6WDWHV¶MXULVGLFWLRQUXOHVDSSOLFDEOHWR a defendant not domiciled in an EU Member State.84 In 
such a case, unless the Brazilian business was present or submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
English courts, the English courts would have to grant service of proceedings out of the 
jurisdiction, if the consumer could demonstrate that the English court is forum conveniens. 
Whilst the prospect of an individual consumer being able to take such action against a 
foreign business (whether EU or non-EU based) is slim, the protectionist objectives of both 
jurisdiction and choice of law rules for consumer contracts should ensure that the mandatory 
UXOHVRIWKHFRQVXPHU¶VGRPLFLOH± English law in these three examples ± still applies. 
Nevertheless, the effective horizontal application of Article 15(1)(c) continues to rest upon 
the interpretation by the Court of Justice. Crucially, there have been a number of recent 
decisions from the Court of Justice which have sought to clarify discrete aspects of Article 
15, . Whilst these cases have been generally instructive, they demonstrate the limitations of 
the terminology used and the strict interpretation of the special jurisdiction. In Pammer and 
Hotel Alpenhof,85 as this author has previously stated,86 the prevalent issue was whether the 
DFWLYLWLHVRIDEXVLQHVV¶RUDJHQW¶VZHEVLWHGHPRQVWUDWHGDµVXIILFLHQWFRQQHFWLRQ¶
µDOLJQPHQW¶87ZLWKWKH0HPEHU6WDWHRIWKHFRQVXPHUV¶GRPLFLOHLQRUGHUWRHVWDEOLVK
jurisdiction there. Whilst the Court of Justice has sought a harmonious interpretation of  
(now) Article 17(1)(c), 0HPEHU6WDWHV¶FRXUWVDUHVWLOOUHTXLUHGWRDVVHVVZKHWKHUDEXVLQHVV
                                                          
79 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, µConsumer Conditions Scoreboard ± 
Consumers at home in the single market. Monitoring the integration of the retail single market and 
consumer conditions in the Member States¶ 7th edn, May 2012, draft at pp.4 and 32. 
80 Stone (n.20), 125. 
81 Briggs (n.19), 74. 
82 Briggs, ibid. 
83 See below regarding the effect of Article 17, Regulation EC1215/2012. 
84 Using English Civil Procedure Rule 6.36. 
85 Joined cases C-585/08 and C-144/09 Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof  OJ 2011 C55/4. 
86 L Gillies, µClarifying the ³philosophy of Article 15´ in the Brussels I Regulation: Pammer v Reederei 
Karl Schulter GmbH & Co KG (C-585/08) and Hotel Alpenhof (C-144/09),¶ (2011) 60 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 557. 
87 Ibid, 558. 
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µXVHVDVZHEVLWHWRDOLJQGLUHFWRUWDUJHWLWVDFWLYLWLHVWRFRQVXPHUV¶.88 This assessment 
requires the national court WRWDNHDFFRXQWWKHJHRJUDSKLFDOVFRSHRIWKHEXVLQHVV¶ORFDWLRQ
the provision of commercial services and the construction of the website in question. 
A Preliminary Reference has yet to be put to the Court as to WKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKDEXVLQHVV¶
web-based software DSSOLFDWLRQµDSS¶FRQVWLWXWHVGLUHFWHGDFWLYLW\towDUGVWKHFRQVXPHU¶V
domicile by analogy with an active website. However, in Daniela Mühlleitner v Ahmad Yusufi 
and Wadat Yusufi,89 the Court of Justice confirmed its earlier approach in Ilsinger v 
Dreschers90 that a contract between the business and the consumer did not have to be 
concluded LQWKHFRQVXPHU¶VGRPLFLOH for Article 15(1)(c) (now  Article 17(1)(c) ) to operate. 
In Mühlleitner, the claimant raised proceedings in Austria concerned with the sale of 
defective goods. The defendants argued that they should be sued in Germany since they 
VDLGWKH\GLGQRWGLUHFWWKHLUDFWLYLWLHVWR$XVWULDDQGWKDWWKHSDUWLHV¶FRQWUDFWZDVFRQFOXGHG
in Germany. Having failed to establish jurisdiction at first instance, the Austrian Appeal court 
referred to the CommissiRQDQG&RXQFLO¶VHDUOLHUµ6WDWHPHQWRQ$UWLFOH¶91 which required 
the contract to be concluded at a distance. The claimant appealed to the highest Austrian 
court which, based on Pammer, regarded the defendants as having directed their activities 
to Austria. In the end, the Court of Justice only answered the particular question whether the 
consumer contract had to be concluded at a distance for Article 15(1)(c)  (now  Article 
17(1)(c)) to operate. The Court of Justice said that it did not require to be concluded at a 
distance to ensure that the jurisdiction rule operated as a derogation to Article 2  (now  
Article 4 ) as the general rule. Furthermore, the interpretation of Article15(1)(c) ) (now  Article 
17(1)(c)) was to ensure it took account of changes in technology to the extent that the 
previous requirement under Article 13 of the Brussels Convention 1968 that the 
DGYHUWLVHPHQWZDVPDGHLQWKHFRQVXPHU¶V0HPEHU6WDWHFRQVXPHUFRQFOXGHGWKHFRQWUDFW
in his domicile was removed. It is to be expected therefore that this reasoning would apply to 
a business app which provides the equivalent or greater functionality for interaction between 
the parties, irrespective of where the consumer is situated at the time the contract is 
concluded. 
In a similar case, Lokman Emrek v Vlado Sabranovic,92 the claimant argued that the 
German court had jurisdiction for breach of warranty of a second hand car and that the 
GHIHQGDQW¶VEXVLQHVVDFWLYLWLHVRQWKHLQWHUQHWZHUHGLUHFWHGWR*HUPDQ\7KH*HUPDQFRXUW
did not uphold jurisdLFWLRQVLQFH0U6DEUDQRYLF¶VZHEVLWHZDVQRWGHHPHGWRKDYHEHHQ
directed to Germany. So Mr Embrek appealed arguing that no causal link required to be 
shown between the website, the commercial activity and the conclusion of the contract. The 
Regional GermaQFRXUWDJUHHGZLWK0U(PUHNWKDWDFDXVDOOLQNZDVQRWUHTXLUHGEXWWKDWµDW
WKHYHU\OHDVWWKHWUDGHU¶V,QWHUQHWVLWHVKRXOGIRUPWKHEDVLVRIWKHDFWXDOFRQFOXVLRQRIWKH
contract with the consumer «¶93 so as to avoid fortuitously contracting with a trader. The 
Court of Justice followed its previous decision in Shearson Lehmann Hutton v TVB94 and 
held that whilst a causal link is not a requirement of Article 15  (now  Article 17 ), in terms of 
proof, it may constitute strong evidence of the link between the contract and the seller. 
                                                          
88 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) C-585/08 and C-144/09, 7 December 2010, para.73 and 
Gillies (n.86), 559; C-89/91 Shearson Lehman Hutton v TVB [1993] ECR I-139 at 154. 
89 Case C-190/11, Daniela Mühlleitner v Ahmad Yusufi and Wadat Yusufi, Judgment of the Court 
(Fourth Chamber), OJ 2012 C355/6, 6 September 2012. 
90 Case C-180/06, Renate Ilsinger v Martin Dreschers (administrator in the insolvency of Schlank & 
Schick GmbH) OJ 2009 C153/5. 
91 (XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQµ6WDWHPHQWRQ$UWLFOHDQG¶DYDLODEOH6 April 2016 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/homepage/homepage_ec_en_declaration.pdf. 
92 Case C-218/12, Lokman Emrek v Vlado Sabranovic OJ 2013 C367/14, 17 October 2013. 
93 Emrek, para.17; the requirement for the ³FRQFOXVLRQRIDFRQWUDFWZLWKWKHSURIHVVLRQDOFRQFHUQHG´
was reiterated by the Court in C-375/13 Harald Kolassa, (n.54), at paras 25, 29 and 30. 
94 Case C-89/91, Shearson Lehman Hutton v TVB [1993] ECR I-139. 
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Since 10 January 2015, Regulation EC 44/2001 has been replaced by Regulation EC 
1215/2012, known as the Brussels I Recast. Whilst there is no substantive change to the 
content of the special jurisdiction rule for consumer contracts in Article 17, a change of 
emphasis has sought to enhance the ability of consumers to raise proceedings in their home 
jurisdiction under Article 18 (ex Article 16). Under Article 16 of the Brussels I Regulation, 
consumers were able to bring proceedings against businesses in other EU Member States in 
the courts of their domicile or the court of the Member State in which the other party is 
domiciled. 7KLVGXDOLVWDSSURDFKUHTXLUHGUHIHUHQFHWR0HPEHU6WDWHV¶UHVLGXDOMXULVGLFWLRQ
rules in the event that the business seller was domiciled in a non-EU Member State. As a 
consequence of the Amendment to the Brussels I Regulation proposed by the European 
Council and the European Parliament, the Brussels I Recast has introduced µSDUWLDOUHIOH[LYH
HIIHFW¶.95 In essence, the operation of the current basis for proceedings in the Member State 
where the consumer has his habitual residence will be extended beyond the scope of 
businesses situated in another Member State. The consequence of this Amendment is now 
contained in Article 18 of the Recast. In essence, whether or not the business is domiciled in 
a Member State, consumers may bring proceedings against a defendant business in the 
courts of a Member State where the consumer is domiciled. The justification for this 
Amendment is to enable further access to justice. This Amendment is a particularly 
significant approximation of special jurisdiction rules for the EU consumer and for 
businesses domiciled outside the EU. Whilst they may not have a branch, agency or other 
establishment in an EU Member State, such businesses may target EU consumers via 
websites. Whilst the approximation of such rules may be intended to increase the scope for 
FRQVXPHU¶VWRUDLVHSURFHHGLQJVZKHUHWKH\DUHGRPLFLOHGWKHSUDFWLFDOQHWHIIHFWRIWKLV
FKDQJHLVWRHQVXUHJUHDWHUDFFHVVWRWKHVXEVWDQWLYHODZRIWKHFRQVXPHU¶VKDELWXDO
residence, including its mandatory rules where applicable. 
 
PART III: THE INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO MUTUAL RECOGNITION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS IN EU1215/2012, THE BRUSSELS I RECAST 
EU Private international laws are also concerned with ensuring judgments are capable of 
automatic recognition and enforcement between Member States)URPWKHFRQVXPHU¶V
perspective, being able to sue a business, regardless of its domicile, in his own jurisdiction is 
pivotal. As mentioned above, the consumer can be assured of the knowledge of his own 
courts as well as the substantive law. Once the consumer or his representative obtains a 
judgment, the dual issues of recognition and enforcement arise. In accordance with Article 
36 of the Recast (ex Article 33(1)), a judgment obtained from a Member State was capable 
of recognition in another Member State without any special form or procedure. Furthermore, 
judgments from Member States were entitled enforcement in another Member State once 
declared enforceable. In order to streamline the enforcement procedure and support the 
mutual recognition of decisions between the Member States, the requirements for exequatur 
± intermediate measures96 to declare the enforceability of a judgment from one Member 
State in another ± have been abolished by Article 39 of the Recast. 
 
PART IV: COORDINATING EU PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAWS WITH 
INITIATIVES IN COLLECTIVE REDRESS AND THE COMMON EUROPEAN 
SALES LAW 
More recently, the EU Commission has put forward two new, inter-related proposals. The 
ILUVWLVWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶Vµ,QLWLDWLYHRQ&ROOHFWLYH5HGUHVV¶.97 The second proposal is a 
                                                          
95 European Parliament, µAmendment 121 to the Proposed Recast of the Brussels I Regulation¶ 
2010/0383 (COD), 25 September 2012 at p.5. 
96 Regulation EC 1215/2012, Recital (2). 





Articles 47 and 6 as principles of the Charter,100 to equip anyone101 ZLWKWKHµULJKW¶102 to claim 
µIXOOFRPSHQVDWLRQ>IRUD@KDUPFDXVHGE\DQLQIULQJHPHQWRIFRPSHWLWLRQODZ¶.103 For this 
SXUSRVHFRQVXPHUVPD\EHHLWKHUµGLUHFWSXUFKDVHUV¶ZKRKDve suffered direct infringement 
such as an overcharge104 by the infriQJLQJEXVLQHVVRUWKH\PD\EHµLQGLUHFWSXUFKDVHUV¶105 
who have suffered damage as a result of the passing-on of the particular infringing activity to 
them as end-user. It remains to be seen how the effectiveness, fairness and the logistics of 
proceedings under this proposal operate and whether a social justice or deterrence function 
is the likely outcome. 
Both the Rome I and Rome II Regulations contain special choice of law rules for 
consumer contracts. Both sets of rules have been introduced to determine what law applies 
to a cross-border consumer contract or where individual or collective consumers claim for 
damages as a result of a breach of a non-contractual obligation. Like Regulation EC 
44/2001, the changes to the special choice of law rule for consumer contracts in the Rome 
Convention 1980 in Regulation EC 593/2008 (the Rome I Regulation) were undertaken to 
reflect initial technological advances of cross-border selling. Article 6 of Regulation EC 
864/2007, the Rome II Regulation, contains a distinct choice of law rule for claims against 
businesses for anti-competitive behaviour or acts restricting competition. This is a novel 
FKRLFHRIODZUXOHGHVLJQHGWRSURWHFWµKRUL]RQWDO>DQG@YHUWLFDO¶106 relations between market 
participants. Article 6(1) of the Rome II Regulation FRQILUPVWKDWWKHDSSOLFDEOHODZLVWKHµODZ
of the country where competitive relations or the collective interests of consumers have been 
DIIHFWHG¶. Three aspects will underpin the utility of this choice of law rule. First, in order to 
maintain legal certainty and predictability of result, the parties to a dispute of this nature are 
not permitted to select the applicable law (Article 6(4)). Second, this choice of law rule 
imputes the potential for consumers, or their representatives, to take collective action over 
such disputes and for the law of the place where the non-contractual obligation occurred to 
apply or the lex fori if that place is one of the affected markets. However, this is dependent 
upon the accessibility of collective redress actions in Member States and the future EU 
proposals for both collective redress and damages for anti-competitive behaviour. One issue 
DPRQJVWPDQ\WKDWUHPDLQVWREHGHWHUPLQHGLVWKHPHDQLQJRIWKHWHUPµDIIHFWHGPDUNHW¶
which underpins Article 6 of the Rome II Regulation. 
Article 6 of the Regulation EC 593/2008, the Rome I Regulation, contains a special 
choice of law rule for particular consumer contracts. This rule, legitimately regarded by 
%ULJJVDVµXQWLG\DQGSUREOHPDWLF¶,107 highlights in the narrow sense the challenge of 
reconciling support for the market and protection for consumers through social policy. Article 
6 of Rome I seeks to sustain two competing objectives; the preservation of party autonomy 
                                                          
98 Amendments by the European Parliament to the Commission Proposal, µDirective of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union¶ 
A7-0089/2014, 9 April 2014, available 6 April 2016 at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+AMD+A7-2014-
0089+002-002+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 
99 Amendment, ibid at p.4. 
100 Amendment, ibid at p.32. 
101 Amendment, Article 1 at p.34. 
102 Amendment, Article 2(2), ibid at p.35. 
103 Amendment, Article 2(1), ibid at p.35. 
104 Amendment, Article 14(2), ibid at pp.55±6. 
105 Amendment, Article 4(23) and (24), ibid at p.41. 
106 G Howells and S Weatherill, Consumer Protection Law, 2nd edn (Ashgate, 2005), 533; A 
Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation: The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 403. 
107 Briggs (n.19), 244. 
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by enabling the parties to select the applicable law whilst ensuring the application of the 
mandatory provisions ± social policy priorities ± RIWKHFRQVXPHU¶VKDELWXDOUHVLGHQFH7KH
dualist approach to EU choice of law rules seeks to reflect equitable interests and market 
objectives:108 it respects the premise that choice of law is founded on party autonomy whilst 
LQWHJUDWLQJ0HPEHU6WDWHV¶PDQGDWRU\UXOHVWKURXJKFRQWLQXHGVKDUHGFRPSHWHQFHLQ
consumer protection between the EU and its Member States on the other. However, in the 
light of the previous proposal for a Common European Sales Law (CESL), the role of both 
approximated EU choice of law rules and the reference to the mandatory rules of the 
FRQVXPHU¶VKDELWXDOUHVLGHQFHZLOOEHFRPHLQFUHDVLQJO\VLJQLILFDQW for any future initiative 
with similar objectives. 
Having selected the applicable law to the cross-border consumer contract, the 
essence of the (XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶VRULJLQDOSURSRVDOIRUDCESL was to enable 
consumers and business contracting (electronically) across borders to elect to apply a set of 
RSWLRQDOFRQWUDFWODZVWRWKHSDUWLHV¶FRQWUDFW. Despite suggestions that Article 6 of the Rome 
I Regulation would have been made redundant by the CESL, given the above application, 
the operation of the CESL would have necessitated both selection of the applicable law 
supported by an applicable law rule. Furthermore, the optional nature of the proposed CESL 
reinforced its limited impact upon the necessity for Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation. Once 
a choice of law has been made in accordance with Article 6, if the optional CESL had come 
into force as proposed, it would at that stage have had potentially significant consequences 
for the operation of the protective component to Article 6, namely the operation of the 
mandator\UXOHVRIWKHFRQVXPHU¶VKDELWXDOUHVLGHQFH7KHSDUWLHV¶DELOLW\WRopt in to the 
CESL would have extended party autonomy beyond the context originally envisaged by 
Article 3 and 6 of the Rome I Regulation. A future revision of the Rome I Regulation will 
therefore UHTXLUHDFDUHIXODVVHVVPHQWRIWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKH[LVWLQJ0HPEHU6WDWHV¶
mandatory rules will be impacted by any future CESL or Regulation for cross-border online 
consumer contracts and the hierarchy to be set between such secondary regulations, the 
scope of such instruments and the mandatory rules of the FRQVXPHU¶VKDELWXDOUHVLGHQFH
given effect by Article 6, Rome I. However, before current attempts to introduce EU contract 
laws for cross-border sales109 move forward, what must be reviewed and reconciled is the 
YDOXHRIWKHFXUUHQWQDWLRQDOPDQGDWRU\UXOHVRIWKHFRQVXPHUV¶KDELWXDOUHVLGHQFHWKH
overarching need to promote an optional set of maximised, EU contract laws which may or 
may not be equivalent to the current mandatory rules and the ability of the parties to opt-in to 
such laws. In sum, at least the same or a greater level of consumer protection law that a 
consumer would ordinarily be entitled to via the mandatory rules of his habitual residence 
must be sustained by a future sales instrument/CESL v.2 for it to be a viable, effective and 
equivalent  option for consumers. What remains to be determined is whether parties and 
their legal representatives would apply an an optional sales law to their cross-border 
contracts.110 
 
CONCLUSIONS: FUTURE QUESTIONS 
It has been the purpose of this cKDSWHUWRFRQVLGHUKRZDVDWHFKQLTXHRIµDFFHVVto MXVWLFH¶, 
the third wave of approximated, EU private international laws may RSHUDWHDVDQµ(8
QRUP¶111 by enabling businesses and consumers to cross-border contracts to exercise a 
                                                          
108 Weatherill (n.6), 283. 
109 European Commission, µCommunication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital 
Single Market Strategy for Europe¶ SWD (2015) 100 final, 6 May 2015. 
110 Evidence as to the extent to which businesses remain concerned about the legal and financial 
FRVWVRI0HPEHU6WDWHV¶GLIIHULQJFRQWUDFWODws is not definitive: SWD (2015) 100 final at p.12. 
111 Benöhr and Micklitz (n.3), 31. 
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IXQGDPHQWDOULJKWWRµDFFHVV>VRFLDO@MXVWLFH¶112 irrespective of the means of contracting, the 
location of the business seller, the technological means and place of contracting, the 
applicable law or further optional sales law selected. In the absence of a constitutional basis 
for either consumer protection or fundamental social rights, EU private international law 
seeks to support the former and promote the latter by sustaining party autonomy in the free 
movement of goods and services whilst coordinating and complementing the diversity of 
values between 0HPEHU6WDWHV¶VXEVWDQWLYHODZV8QWLOVXFKWLPHWKDWconstitutional, 
substantive and procedural rules relative to cross-border obligations are devised, agreed, 
implemented and operated in a consistent manner between all EU Member States, 
approximated EU private international laws must continue to act as a µPHWKRGRORJLFDO
LQVWLWXWLRQDODQGSURFHGXUDO¶113 gatekeeper in advancing fundamental social rights in the 
resolution of cross-border disputes. 
                                                          
112 Micklitz (n.2), word added for syntax. 
113 Semmelmann (n.1), 532. 
